Innovation in business groups by Belenzon, Sharon & Berkovitz, Tomer
  
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 833 
November 2007 
Innovation in Business Groups 
Sharon Belenzon and Tomer Berkovitz 
 
 
    
Abstract 
Using novel data on European firms, this paper examines the effect of business group affiliation on 
innovation. We find that business groups foster the scale and novelty of corporate innovation. Group 
affiliation is particularly important in industries that rely more on external finance and have a higher 
degree of information asymmetry. We also find that the innovation of affiliates is less sensitive to 
operating cash flows. We interpret our results as supporting the ‘bright side’ of business group 
internal capital markets and explain how legal boundaries between group affiliates mitigate the 
inefficiencies found in internal capital markets of US conglomerates. 
 
 
Keywords: business groups, innovation, internal capital markets 
JEL Classifications: G34, L22, L26, and O32 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Productivity and Innovation Programme.  The Centre 
for Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We express our special gratitude to Patrick Bolton, Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, Mark Schankerman 
and John Van Reenen for numerous helpful discussions. We are also grateful for valuable comments 
from Nick Bloom, Steve Bond, Bjorn Jorgensen, Tarun Khanna, Daniel Paravisini, Tano Santos, 
Catherine Thomas, Manuel Trajtenberg, Daniel Wolfenzon, Yishay Yafeh and seminar participants at 
Columbia University (GSB), Hebrew University, London Business School Transatlantic Conference, 
London School of Economics, NBER, and Oxford University. We thank Liat Oren for invaluable 
assistance with the programming of the ownership algorithm, Hadar Gafni for excellent research 
assistance, and the Institute for Fiscal Studies, especially Rachel Griffith and Gareth Macartney, for 
the EPO patent matching. All remaining errors are our own.  
 Sharon Belenzon is a Research Economist with the Productivity and Innovation Research 
Group at the Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics. He is also a 
Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. Tomer Berkovitz is a 
Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Columbia University, Graduate School of Business, NY, USA. 
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 
© S. Belenzon and T. Berkovitz, submitted 2007 
 
ISBN 978-0-85328-208-2 
1. Introduction
Extensive empirical literature over the past three decades has investigated the incen-
tives of firms to innovate and the eﬀect of innovation on performance.1 More recently,
La Porta et al. (1999) showed that outside the US, legally independent firms are
commonly tied together through ownership links to form business groups. Yet, little
attention has been devoted to the relation between business groups and innovation.
This is especially surprising in light of the long debate in the literature on the eﬀect
of firm boundaries on the allocation of resources (Coase (1937), Mullainathan and
Scharfstein (2001)).2 In this paper, we provide a new perspective on how the bound-
aries between firms may aﬀect the allocation of internal funds to R&D activity. Using
a novel database, we show that while large organizations comprised of a single legal
entity have been found to stifle innovation (e.g. Seru (2007) on US conglomerates),
business groups foster innovation via a more eﬃcient internal capital market.
In a world with asymmetric information, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Greenwald
et al. (1984) argue that external financing is more costly than internal financing. If the
asymmetric information problem is mitigated within a business group, an aﬃliated firm
can gain access to more capital than a standalone firm and at a lower cost. Internal
capital markets are especially important for innovation, where there is typically a high
degree of asymmetric information between the firm and outside investors (Himmelberg
and Peterson (1994)). While a standalone firm seeking to externally finance its R&D
activity needs to turn to financial market intermediaries (venture capital funds, banks,
etc.), a group-aﬃliated firm can rely on the group internal capital market.
Internal capital markets, however, have also been shown to have a ‘dark side’ in US
conglomerates. Seru (2007) finds that conglomerates stifle innovation and relates his
findings to ineﬃciencies in their internal capital markets. Seru finds that conglomerates
employing central budget allocation are exposed to an agency problem between the
division managers, who seek to maximize their budget, and the CEO, who acts to
maximize firm value. This agency problem is particularly pronounced in novel R&D
1See Griliches (1998) for a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature.
2More recent studies on the eﬀect of organizational design on innovation include Guedj and Scharf-
stein (2004), Guedj (2006), and Seru (2007).
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projects where there is high degree of information asymmetry between the CEO and
the division managers.
Business groups are fundamentally diﬀerent from conglomerates since groups are
composed of legally independent companies, typically, with minority shareholders.
While the CEO of a conglomerate can shift funds from one division to the other at
a low cost, the ultimate owner of a business group incurs larger costs when shifting
funds between group members, especially when expropriating the rights of minority
shareholders. In addition, the legal boundaries between group members allow for en-
forceable intra-group lending contracts, whereas in conglomerates, the lack of ex-post
commitment mechanism renders intra-division contracts unenforceable.
This paper studies the eﬀect of business group aﬃliation on innovation. We make
three key contributions: (i) establish a positive eﬀect of business group aﬃliation on
the scale and novelty of corporate innovation, (ii) link this eﬀect to the existence of
eﬃcient internal capital markets in business groups, and (iii) explain how the struc-
tural diﬀerences between business groups and conglomerates can explain the observed
diﬀerences in the eﬀect of their internal capital markets on innovation.
Business group aﬃliation is endogenous and might be aﬀected by unobserved firm
characteristics. More specifically, if groups can identify standalone firms with higher
expected success probability, they may engage in ‘winner-picking’. We mitigate the
potential group selection bias in four ways. First, our ownership structure is stable
over the estimation period 1995-2004. We merge our ownership data with a database
on mergers and acquisitions and exclude firms that experience a change in their busi-
ness group aﬃliation status, pushing back the potential endogeneity problem to the
beginning of the sample. Second, we mitigate the eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity
in firm-level innovation quality at the beginning of our sample by controlling for the
pre-sample average number of patents of each firm (Blundell et al. (1999)). Third, we
construct exogenous industry variables to study a specific channel through which group
aﬃliation positively aﬀects innovation. Finally, we mitigate the selection problem by
examining specifications with only aﬃliated firms and analyzing the eﬀect of group size
on innovation. In such specifications the ‘winner-picking’ bias is likely to be smaller as
now all firms in the sample belong to business groups.
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Our analysis is based on four novel datasets on private and public European firms.
First, in order to determine business group aﬃliation and construct detailed measures
of group characteristics, we develop a unique algorithm that builds the complete struc-
ture of business groups based on approximately one million ownership links from the
Amadeus ownership database. Second, to proxy for innovation, we match all patent
applications from the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) and the United States Patent and
Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) to all firms in the Amadeus database. Third, we use acad-
emic publications as a proxy for the novelty of innovation. For this purpose, we match
the firm name in the Amadeus database to the address field in Thomson’s ISI Web
of Science database. Finally, we use current and historical versions of the Amadeus
accounting database to build a comprehensive panel data of firm characteristics.
Using our newly assembled database, we investigate whether aﬃliated firms patent
more than standalones and examine the novelty of their innovation. Controlling for
various firm characteristics, we find that group-aﬃliated firms have 30 percent more
patents than standalone firms. Yet, the diﬀerence in the number of patents may not
reflect a diﬀerence in the quality of innovation, but rather the relative advantage of
business groups in issuing patents. Groups may utilize economies of scale to employ a
specialized team of patent attorneys and intellectual property experts to advise them
on the best patenting strategies and have broader experience, talent management,
etc. To address this concern, we examine the relative quality of patents using two
measures: number of citations a patent receives and the eﬀect of the number of patents
on the firm’s productivity. Both measures reveal that aﬃliates engage in more novel
innovation.
Patents are a common measure of innovation. Yet, not all inventions are patentable
and in many cases basic and novel research is published in academic journals (Cock-
burn and Henderson (1998)). Thus, we also test the eﬀect of group aﬃliation on the
number of academic publications in ‘hard science’ journals. To proxy for the quality of
publications, we use two measures: the number of publications weighted by the number
of citations and the number of publications in high-impact journals. According to both
measures, group aﬃliation has a positive and significant eﬀect on innovation.
Having found that aﬃliates systematically innovate more than standalones, we
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proceed to examine whether the group internal capital market might be a channel
through which this eﬀect takes place. Our main empirical strategy is to examine
whether the eﬀect of group aﬃliation systematically varies with exogenous industry
conditions that are consistent with the internal capital markets theory. We focus on
three industry characteristics: dependence on external funds, investment intensity, and
the degree of asymmetric information.
If group aﬃliation aﬀects innovation by providing cheaper external funding, we
would expect this eﬀect to be stronger in industries where firms (for exogenous reasons)
invest more and rely more on external funds. We follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
rank industries by their investment intensity and their dependence on external funding.
Consistent with the internal markets hypothesis, we find that the positive eﬀect of
business group aﬃliation on innovation is more pronounced in industries that have
higher investment intensity, higher external finance dependence, and higher external
equity dependence.
Internal capital markets reduce the cost of asymmetric information between inno-
vating firms and outsiders. Hence, we would expect group aﬃliation to have a stronger
eﬀect on innovation in industries where it is harder for outsiders to learn about the
idiosyncratic value of firms. We construct two industry measures to capture this: Pro-
ductivity Growth Dispersion and average Tobin’s Q (Lee (1992), Gompers (1995)).
High productivity dispersion within an industry means that firm performance in that
industry is aﬀected more by idiosyncratic components than by aggregate shocks. High
average Tobin’s Q implies that a larger fraction of firm value in that industry is associ-
ated with intangible assets, which makes it harder for the outside investor to evaluate
those firms. Our findings support the internal capital markets hypothesis. We find
that firms that operate in industries with a higher level of asymmetric information
(according to both measures) benefit more from group aﬃliation.
Hoshi et al. (1991) show that the investment of Japanese group-aﬃliated firms
is less sensitive to liquidity than unaﬃliated firms because they rely on the group
internal capital market. Assuming that aﬃliated European firms rely on the group
internal market to finance their investments in R&D, while standalone firms rely more
on their own internal liquidity, we would expect the eﬀect of liquidity on innovation to
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be stronger for standalone firms. Our findings confirm this prediction: firm’s liquidity
positively aﬀects innovation in standalone firms, but has no statistically significant
eﬀect on aﬃliated firms.
While we focus our analysis on internal capital markets, other hypotheses may
explain the diﬀerence in innovation between aﬃliates and standalones. We discuss
several alternative hypotheses including knowledge spillovers, quality of governance,
and multinationals. We do not find an alternative hypothesis that is consistent with
all of our findings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data, Section 3
provides descriptive statistics, Section 4 describes the econometric specification, Section
5 reports the results, Section 6 discusses issues raised by our findings, Section 7 discusses
alternative hypotheses, and Section 8 concludes.
2. Data
This paper combines data from four main sources: (1) ownership data on business-
groups from Amadeus, (2) information on patents and citations from the European
Patent Oﬃce (EPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO),
(3) academic publication data from Thomson Web of Knowledge, and (4) accounting
data from Amadeus and Compustat. In this section, we explain our methodology for
constructing the four datasets and describe our sample.
(1) Business groups - following previous literature including Almeida andWolfenzon
(2006), we define a business group as an organizational form in which at least two
legally independent firms are controlled by the same ultimate owner. In order to
fully characterize groups, we determine group aﬃliation status for all firms in the
Amadeus database. For this purpose, we refer to the Amadeus ownership database,
which includes detailed information on direct ownership links between firms in Europe.
To ensure all ownership links represent control, we make the following assumptions: for
private subsidiaries, we keep only links where the shareholder has at least 50 percent of
the voting rights and for public firms, we keep only links where the shareholder has at
least 20 percent of the voting rights.3 These two assumptions leave us with close to one
3For reasons of conservatism and simplicity, we define control of a private firm as owning more
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million ownership links. In order to infer group structure from these links, we develop
an algorithm that constructs the corporate control chains, and then group together
firms controlled by the same ultimate owner. Appendix A1 discusses the algorithm in
greater detail.
(2) Patents - In order to generate a firm-level measure of innovation, we look at
patent based measures which capture technological advances by firms and were shown
to be a better measure of research productivity than R&D investments (Griliches (1990)
and Trajtenberg (1990)). We constructed a unique novel database of European firm
patents by matching all granted patent applications from the EPO and the USPTO to
the complete list of Amadeus firms (about 8 million firm names) for the period 1979-
2004. The sample of innovating firms used in the paper is the set of firms for which we
find a match with the name on a patent applicant record.
In addition to patenting information, we also use patent citations data to measure
the quality of patents. Patent quality is highly skewed where only few patents have
significant economic value. A common method to proxy for the quality of patents is
by counting the number of citations they receive (Trajtenberg (1990) and Hall et al.
(2005)). Following this methodology, we compute a citations-weighted patent count
where the weights are computed as the ratio between the number of citations patent i
receives and the total number of citations made to other patents granted in the same
year as patent i.
(3) Academic publications - Another measure of innovation is publication in aca-
demic journals (e.g., Cockburn and Henderson (1998)). To measure the publication
activity of our sample firms, we develop a dataset on publications in academic journals.
The world’s largest source of information on academic publications is the Thomson’s
ISI Web of Knowledge, which includes publication records on hundreds of international
journals in ‘hard’ sciences (such as natural or physical sciences). Each publication has
an address field which contains the authors’ aﬃliation. We match all patenting firms
by name to the complete ISI database. For each publication, we also have information
than 50% of the firm’s voting rights (excluding non-voting shares). Following previous literature on
public firms (La Porta et al. (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002) and others), which have a more dispersed
ownership, we set the threshold for public firms at 20%. All the results of this paper are robust to
diﬀerent plausible specifications of these thresholds.
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on the number of citations, which we use to control for the quality of the publication.
With similar data at the journal level, we are able to control for the importance of the
journal in which the article was published (this is done by using the impact factor from
the Journal Citations Report). We find that 1,094 patenting firms also publish at least
one journal article in the period 1979-2004. During the estimation sample (1995-2004),
these firms publish on average 0.82 articles per year and 4,852 articles in total. These
articles received 43,440 citations from the scientific community.
(4) Accounting - accounting information is taken from Amadeus. The source of the
accounting information is the Company Register House in each of the twelve countries
included in our sample. The key advantage of these data is their large coverage of
firms and unique accounting information on private firms with a wide size distribution.
Yet, the accounting data has some limitations. First, countries diﬀer in reporting
requirements. For example, very small firms (fewer than 10 employees) in Great Britain
are not obliged to disclose accounting information including number of employees,
sales, or total assets. On the other hand, French firms must provide such information
regardless of their size. Second, firms that do not report accounting information for four
consecutive years are dropped from the Amadeus database. Thus, firms that existed
in the 2003 sample might be dropped in the 2004 update. In order to capture all the
firms that were dropped from the Amadeus sample we purchased older publications of
Amadeus and added all firms that appeared in the older publications but were dropped
from the 2004 update. We find that about 5 percent of firms are dropped from the
Amadeus database each year.
3. First Look at the Data
12,749 firms in Amadeus which report lagged sales also have at least one patent from
the European Patent Oﬃce between 1979 and 2004. To avoid double-counting of
accounting variables, we drop all firms that do not report unconsolidated accounts,
which leaves us with 12,389 firms. Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on
the key firm-level characteristics. On average, a firm in our sample has approximately
one patent every two years. Our sample covers firms from a wide size distribution: the
median number of employees per firm-year in our sample is 109, the 90th percentile
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is 982, and the 10th percentile is 7. For sales, the median is about $16 million, the
90th percentile is $203 million, and the 10th percentile is only $0.6 million. Out of the
12,389 firms in our sample, 1,094 firms publish in academic journals. They publish on
average 0.81 articles a year.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the group-level characteristics of the innovating firms
in our sample. Out of the 12,389 innovating firms, 6,289 firms are aﬃliated with 4,970
diﬀerent groups (the remaining firms are standalones). The distribution of the number
of firms in each group is highly skewed with a median of 12 firms and an average of
72 firms (the 90th percentile is 200 firms). Group aﬃliates are spread across diﬀerent
industries - the average HHI of industry concentration is 0.26 with a median of 0.17.
Finally, 51 percent of the innovating firms are aﬃliated with business groups.
Consider, for example, the Nasi-Agnelli group described in Figure 1. The Nasi
and Angnelli families control Ifil Finanziaria, the investment company of the group
which is located at the apex of the organizational structure. The families control
186 firms through complex ownership chains of up to 9 layers. Overall, the Nasi and
Agnelli families control firms with total assets of $172 billion and annual cash flows
(estimated by net income plus depreciation) of $2 billion. These figures demonstrate
the substantial size of the group’s internal capital market which can be used to finance
R&D investments. Indeed, 8 firms in the group conduct innovation activity and have
a total of 795 patents.
Table 2 reports summary statistics separately for aﬃliates and standalones. On
average, an aﬃliated firm has close to twice as many patents per year compared to
standalone (0.57 versus 0.31). The first graph in Figure 2 shows that this diﬀerence
is consistent across most countries in our sample and is prominent in all major Eu-
ropean economies for which we have more observations (e.g. Great Britain, France,
and Germany). The second graph shows a similar pattern for the number of citations.
The average aﬃliated firm is larger (677 versus 393 employees and $211 million versus
$83 million in sales), and 6 years older than the average standalone. Mean comparison
tests show that these diﬀerences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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4. Econometric Modeling
4.1. Baseline specification
We use the Negative Binomial model to analyze our patent count data. Models for
count data assume a first moment of the form:4
E(Pit|Xit) = exp(x0itβ)
where E(.|.) is the conditional expectations operator and Pit is a count of the number
of patents. We introduce firm fixed eﬀects into the count data model using the ‘mean
scaling’ method of Blundell et al. (1999).5 This relaxes the strict exogeneity assumption
underlying Hausman et al. (1984). Essentially, we exploit the fact that we have a long
pre-sample history (of up to 15 years per firm) on patenting activity to construct its
pre-sample average. This is then used as an initial condition to proxy for unobserved
heterogeneity. The conditional expectation of the estimator is:6
E(Pit|Xit) = exp{β1Groupi + β2 lnSalesit−1 + Z 0itβ4 + ϕj + τ t + ηi} (4.1)
where Groupi is a dummy with value 1 if the firm belongs to a business group and
value 0 if the firm is standalone. Salesit−1 is used to control for firm size (we use lagged
value to mitigate transitory shocks that can aﬀect both the incentive to innovate and
sales), Zit is a vector of control such as a complete set of country dummies, ϕj and
τ t are complete sets of three-digit industry SIC and year dummies and ηi is the firm
fixed-eﬀect.
Due to the panel structure of our data, we correct the standard errors for serial
correlation. This is especially important since the group dummy is constant over time
4See Blundell et al. (1999) and Hausman et al. (1984) for discussions of count data models of
innovation.
5See also Blundell, Griﬃth, and Windmeijer (2002).
6The variance of the Negative Binomial under our specification is:
V (Pit) = exp(x0itβ) + α exp(2x
0
itβ)
where the parameter, α, is a measure of ‘overdispersion’, relaxing the Poisson restriction that the
mean equals the variance (α = 0 ).
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within firms. Therefore, the reported standard errors are always robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and allow for arbitrary serial correlation.
4.2. Dealing with potential biases
4.2.1. Endogeneity bias — ‘Winner-picking’
In our baseline specification, we measure the eﬀect of group aﬃliation on innovation
(β1). If the selection into business groups is endogenous, then our coeﬃcient estimates
are likely to be biased. More specifically, if groups engage in winner-picking (i.e., group
aﬃliation is positively correlated with an unobserved ‘quality’ variable), then β1 would
be upwards biased. We mitigate this potential bias in several ways.
First, since ownership structure is rather consistent over time, we keep in our sample
only firms that maintained their aﬃliation status between 1995 and 2004. We use BvD’s
mergers and acquisition database - Zephyr, to examine changes in group aﬃliation
status. About five percent of firms in our sample experience a change in their ownership
structure — these firms are excluded from our estimation sample.
Second, we compute the average number of patents each firm had prior to our
sample period (from 1979 until the first time the firm appeared in our sample). This
variable is used as a proxy for the unobserved heterogeneity at the beginning of our
sample (Blundell et al. (1999)). Having applied the aforementioned measures, winner-
picking would aﬀect our results only in the following case. A standalone firm joins a
business group before 1995 (since changes in ownership structure from 1995 onwards
were eliminated from our sample). This firm has some unobserved ‘quality’, which is
not captured by the number of its patents up to that time, and still has an eﬀect on the
number of patents of that firm 10 years ahead. While we cannot completely discard
such a scenario, it seems unlikely to have a significant eﬀect on our results.
Third, we suggest a specific channel through which the group aﬃliation positively
aﬀects innovation, internal capital markets, and test it empirically using interactions
with exogenous industry variables. Finally, we mitigate the potential business group
selection bias by testing specifications with only aﬃliated firms. In these specifications,
we drop the standalone firms from our sample and divide the aﬃliated firms into sub-
samples according to the size of their group. Then we test how the size of the group
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aﬀects the innovation of aﬃliated firms.
4.2.2. Unit of observation
In the econometric analysis, we use observations at the firm level. Namely, we compare
a group aﬃliated firm to a standalone firm (and not an entire group to a standalone
firm) because they are legally, empirically, and economically comparable. Since this
issue may relate to the more general discussion about the boundaries of the firm, we
specify the reasons leading us to this choice. First, similar to standalone firms, aﬃliated
firms are legally independent entities. This means that each firm has its own CEO,
board of directors, financial statements, etc. Second, groups are highly diversified
across industries and are larger by an order of magnitude than standalones (e.g. the
average business group has aggregate annual sales of over $3 billion compared to $63
million of standalone). These diﬀerences make groups and standalone econometrically
and economically incomparable. Finally, we use various observed firm characteristics
to control for the remaining diﬀerences between aﬃliates and standalones.
4.2.3. Sample selection — innovating firms
Testing the eﬀect of group aﬃliation on innovation by focusing only on innovating
firms may lead to biased estimators if, for example, the R&D of all firms in a group
is conducted by one firm. To deal with this potential sample selection bias, we test
diﬀerent specifications in which we also include non-innovating firms in our sample.7
We show that both the level of innovation and the decision whether to innovate are
positively aﬀected by group aﬃliation.
4.3. Empirical strategy and definitions of variables
4.3.1. External funds dependence and asymmetric information
Our main empirical strategy is to examine how the eﬀect of group aﬃliation varies with
exogenous industry variables. Specifically, we test whether this variation is consistent
with the theoretical predictions of the internal capital markets hypothesis. We focus
7The non-innovating firms are the set of firms that did not match to the EPO, UPSTO, or the ISI
Web of Knowledge.
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mainly on two industry characteristics: dependence on external funds and the degree
of asymmetric information.
If group aﬃliation aﬀects innovation because it provides cheaper external funds, we
would expect group aﬃliation to be more important for innovation in industries that
(for exogenous reasons) rely more on external funds. We follow Rajan and Zingales
(1998) and rank industries according to their dependence on external funds. In com-
puting measures of external dependence, we use US Compustat firms. As discussed
by Rajan and Zingales (1998), using US firms has important advantages: (i) Since the
US market is one of the most advanced capital markets in the world, large publicly-
traded firms face the least frictions in accessing finance. This means that the amount
of external finance used by these companies is likely to be a pure measure of their
demand for external finance. (ii) Disclosure requirements imply that data on external
financing are comprehensive. (iii) While using US industry data is rather exogenous to
European firms, it is likely that an industry’s dependence on external funds in the US
is a good measure of its dependence in European countries. The only two assumptions
needed are that technological diﬀerences explain why some industries rely on external
funds more than others and that these diﬀerences persist across countries. In addition,
we face a practical limitation in computing the measures of external dependence from
Amadeus since we have no information on capital expenditures for European firms.
We compute two measures of external dependence: External Finance Dependence and
External Equity Dependence. External Finance Dependence is the ratio between cap-
ital expenditures minus cash flow from operations and capital expenditures. External
Equity Dependence is the net amount of equity issued over capital expenditures. An
additional related measure is Investment Intensity which is the ratio between capital
expenditures and net property, plant, and equipment.
Internal capital markets are more beneficial in industries with high level of informa-
tion asymmetry between innovating firms and outside investors. Therefore, we would
expect group aﬃliation to be more important for innovation in industries in which
outsiders find it harder to learn about the idiosyncratic quality of the innovating firm.
We construct two measures to capture this: Productivity Growth Dispersion and Av-
erage Tobin’s Q. Productivity Growth Dispersion is computed as the diﬀerence in the
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three-year average productivity growth between the 90th and 10th percentiles in a
specific industry. A high dispersion means that firm performance is aﬀected more by
idiosyncratic firm factors and less by aggregate shocks and systematic industry factors.
A higher idiosyncratic component would make it more diﬃcult for potential lenders to
learn about the quality of an innovating firm by examining aggregate information about
the industry in which the firm operates. We compute Productivity Growth Dispersion
from the complete set of Amadeus firms for each industry.8 In this case, we use data
from Amadeus and not from Compustat since using Amadeus, productivity growth can
be computed for a wide range of firms, including private ones (other industry measures
are available only for public firms or not available at all in Amadeus).
Our second measure of asymmetric information is Average Tobin’s Q (Lee (1992),
Gompers (1995)). A higher value of average Tobin’s Q implies that a larger fraction
of the firm’s value is associated with intangible assets and future growth opportuni-
ties. Industries in which the value of firm relies more on intangible assets and future
growth opportunity would have a higher degree of information asymmetry. Tobin’s
Q is computed in the usual way using all Compustat firms for the period 1980-2004.
Firm value is the sum of the values of common stock, preferred stock, long-term debt,
and short-term debt net of assets. Book value of capital includes net plant, property
and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and intangibles
(other than R&D). Tobin’s Q is then the ratio between market value and book value
of capital.9
Our empirical specification now becomes:
E(Pit|Xit) = exp{β1Groupi + β2Groupi × Industry Measurej (4.2)
+β2 lnSalesit−1 + Z
0
itβ4 + ϕj + ηi + τ t}
Our main interest in this section is in the coeﬃcient β2, where our industry measures
are external finance dependence, external equity dependence, investment intensity, pro-
ductivity growth dispersion, and average Tobin’s Q. To reject the null hypothesis and
8We also experiment with computing the Productivity Growth Dispersion for each country sepa-
rately. The pattern of results remains similar.
9We winsorize extreme values of Tobin’s Q at 0.1 and 20.
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show that internal capital markets is the channel through which group aﬃliation aﬀects
innovation, β2 has to be significantly greater than zero.
Table 3 presents key summary statistics for all our industry measures. All industry
measures, except the productivity growth dispersion, are calculated based on Compu-
stat firms from 178 diﬀerent industries (three-digit SIC level) in the period 1980-2004.
Productivity growth dispersion is calculated for the same industries based on the com-
plete set of Amadeus firms in the period 1995-2004. Panel A shows the distribution of
the industry variables and Panel B presents the correlation matrix.
Figure 3 shows the diﬀerence in the number of patents between aﬃliates and stand-
alones across our industry measures. It can be seen that, in general, there is a positive
relation between our industry measures and the diﬀerence scale. While for some mea-
sures the relation is almost monotonic (e.g. external equity dependence), for others,
most of the eﬀect is in the highest deciles (e.g. Average Tobin’s Q).
4.3.2. Liquidity
In the presence of asymmetric information in the capital markets, the availability of
internal funds is an important determinant of firms’ investment level. Hoshi et al.
(1991) show that the investment of Japanese group aﬃliated firms is less sensitive to
their liquidity than that of unaﬃliated firms. The authors explain this finding with
the existence of a group internal capital market. While an aﬃliated firm can rely on
the group’s internal capital market, a standalone firm has no access to such funds and
therefore depends more on its own liquidity. Assuming that aﬃliated European firms
rely on the group internal capital market to finance their innovation activity while
standalone firms rely more on their own internal liquidity, we would expect the eﬀect
of liquidity on innovation to be stronger for standalone firms.
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5. Results
5.1. The eﬀect of group aﬃliation
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the eﬀect of business group aﬃliation on
innovation. In columns 1-5, we use the firm-year number of patents granted by the
European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) as our dependent variable. In columns 6-10, we also
include the number of patents granted by the (USPTO) to the European firms in our
sample. In order to avoid double counting of patents on the same invention (granted
both in the EPO and the USPTO), we use the Triadic database published by the OECD
and exclude USPTO patents that appear in the same family as an EPO patent (where
a family is a set of patents that cover the same invention). Our control variables include
sales, pre-sample mean number of patents and a complete set of country, industry, and
year dummies.
We can see in Table 4 that group aﬃliation positively aﬀects the number of patents
granted by the EPO (column 1) and both the EPO and USPTO (column 6). Evaluated
at the sample mean, an aﬃliate has about 30 percent more patents that a standalone.
The positive and significant relation remains when we use the number of firms in the
group as our explanatory variable (columns 2 and 7). In order to understand better the
relation between the size of the group and innovation, we divide all groups into three
categories: small groups (2 or 3 aﬃliated firms), medium groups (between 4 and 50
aﬃliated firms), and large groups (more than 50 aﬃliated firms). We include a dummy
variable for each category (columns 3 and 8), using standalones as the baseline category.
We find that the eﬀect of group aﬃliation increases with the size of the group (the
coeﬃcients of small, medium and large are 0.103, 0.260 and 0.418 respectively). The
eﬀect of group aﬃliation is not significant for small groups, but it is highly significant
for medium and large groups.
Since firm patenting data is persistent over time, periodical shocks can have lasting
eﬀects on the dependent variable, which is not be captured by the other regressors.
Therefore, we also test dynamic specifications by including lagged values of Patents
(columns 4 and 9).10 The pattern of results is similar to our previous estimations.
10In all dynamic specifications, we include a dummy variable for observations where lagged number
of patents is zero.
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In columns 5 and 10, we include only aﬃliated firms to test the robustness of our
results to group selection (using the small business groups as the baseline category).
Consistent with our previous results, we find that aﬃliation with medium and large
groups positively aﬀects innovation and the eﬀect of large groups is more pronounced.
5.1.1. Quality of innovation
We have shown that group aﬃliation positively aﬀects innovation, as measured by the
number of patents. Yet, patents are an imperfect measure of innovation. For exam-
ple, patenting an invention is a costly and lengthy process that requires professional
expertise. Groups may employ a specialized team of patent attorneys and intellec-
tual property experts to advise them on the best patenting strategies, have broader
experience, talent management, etc. This means that for a given quality of research,
an aﬃliated firm could issue more patents than a standalone. The prediction of this
hypothesis is that the diﬀerence between standalones and aﬃliates would be in the
number of patents, but not in the quality of their innovation. In addition, ‘soft budget’
constraints may lead firms aﬃliated with large business groups that have abundant re-
sources to invest in low-quality research. This means that the extra resources provided
by the group aﬃliation lead to more innovation being done, but not to an increase in
its quality and importance.
We test whether business group aﬃliation aﬀects the quality of innovation in three
ways. First, we use patent citations to measure the quality of patents. Patents that
receive more citations are assumed to be of a higher quality (e.g. Trajtenberg (1990)).
If group aﬃliation negatively aﬀects the quality of innovation, we would expect patents
by group aﬃliates to receive a lower number of citations than patents by standalones.
Second, we use academic publications by the firm as a measure of the novelty of in-
novation. We measure the quality of the publication in two ways: by the number of
citations it receives and by counting the number of publications only in high-impact
journals. Finally, higher quality innovation would have a stronger eﬀect on the pro-
ductivity of the firm. To test this, we estimate a production function equation and
examine whether the eﬀect of patenting by standalones and aﬃliates of small groups
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is stronger than that of aﬃliates of larger groups.
We control for the quality of patents by weighing the number of patents by the
citations they receive. Following Trajtenberg (1990), we compute the weights as the
ratio between the number of citations received by the patent and the average number of
citations received by all patents granted in the same year. On average, a patent in our
sample receives 2.44 citations. For patents held by standalones, the average number of
citations per patent is 1.06 and for aﬃliates it is 3.28. Thus, a patent by a group aﬃliate
receives on average 2.21 more citations. The diﬀerence is statistically significant at the
1 percent level (with t statistic of 7.68). When examining the diﬀerence in citations
per patent across firm size, we find a similar pattern. Patents of a firm with fewer
than10 employees (5701 patents) receive on average one additional citation when held
by an aﬃliate (significant at the 1 percent level). The same diﬀerence holds for firms
with fewer than 50 and fewer than100 employees.
In column 1 of Table 5, we find that the coeﬃcient of the business group dummy
is positive, highly significant, and of similar magnitude as in our previous estimations.
The coeﬃcients of the number of firms (column 2) and the dummies for group size
(column 3) are also similar to our previous estimations — group size positively aﬀects
innovation and the eﬀect is only significant for medium and large groups.
In columns 4-6 of Table 5, we use academic publications weighted by the number of
citations as a measure of innovation. We find that the eﬀect of the number of published
articles in academic journals is positively aﬀected by group aﬃliation. Consistent
with the results of our previous estimations, we find that group size positively aﬀects
innovation, especially for medium and large groups.11
Table 6 reports the eﬀect of group aﬃliation and patenting on the productivity
of the firm. We find that patents positively aﬀect productivity for all firms in our
sample (column 1). However, the elasticity of the productivity of the firm with respect
to patents stock is 0.067 and only 0.053 for standalones. We convert the elasticity
to marginal return to patent stock by multiplying the elasticity by sales over patent
11Similar results also hold when we include only publications in high-impact scientific journals (as
indicated by the Journal Citations Report (JCR) index).
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stock (evaluated at the mean). We find that the marginal patent of aﬃliated firm
contributes on average $3.2M, while the return of the marginal patent of a standalone
is only $1.5M. The positive eﬀect of group aﬃliation is even more pronounced when
comparing medium and large groups to small groups and standalones ($3.8M vs. $1.2M,
columns 4-5) or large groups to the rest of the firms ($5.8M vs. $1.5M, columns 6-7).
When controlling for firm fixed eﬀects (‘within firm’), the marginal returns become
$4.3M and $1.7M for aﬃliates of large groups and all other firms, respectively.
5.1.2. Sample selection
Thus far, our data have encompassed only innovating firms. Yet, the decision to inno-
vate is endogenous. The ultimate owner of a business group may decide to concentrate
all innovation eﬀorts in one aﬃliated firm or assign all the patents of the group to a
single subsidiary. If we include only innovating firms in the estimation sample, this
may lead to an upward bias in the coeﬃcient of group aﬃliation. In addition, if indeed
business groups foster innovation, we would expect that group aﬃliation would not
only aﬀect the level of innovation, but would also aﬀect the firm’s decision whether to
innovate.
Table 7 presents the results of a cross-sectional estimation including a random
sample of 10% of the non-innovating firms in the Amadeus database that report em-
ployment and sales of over one million dollars. Our results show that group aﬃliation
positively aﬀects the level of innovation and that the eﬀect is increasing in the size of
the group (columns 1-4). In the Probit estimation (columns 5-8), we find that group
aﬃliation and group size positively aﬀect the firm’s decision of whether to innovate.
The results outlined above show that group aﬃliation has a positive eﬀect on the
scale and novelty of innovation. To better understand the channel through which the
eﬀect operates, we turn to investigate in detail the internal capital markets hypothesis.
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5.2. Internal capital markets
A possible explanation for the strong eﬀect of group aﬃliation on innovation might be
that groups provide internal capital markets that are especially important in financing
risky innovative ventures. We would expect the positive eﬀect of group aﬃliation on
innovation to be more pronounced in industries that rely more on external funds and
that are characterized by higher degree of asymmetric information.
Table 8 reports the estimation results for external dependence. Following Rajan and
Zingales (1998), we examine the interaction of the group dummy with three variables:
External Finance Dependence, External Equity Dependence and Investment intensity.
The interaction term of group dummy with each of the three industry variables is
positive and highly significant. The same pattern of results holds when we control for
various firm and industry characteristics such as liquidity, capital, and competition.
According to the internal capital markets hypothesis, group aﬃliation has a stronger
eﬀect when information asymmetry is higher. To test this hypothesis, we interact
our proxies for industry information asymmetry, Productivity Growth Dispersion, and
Average Tobin’s Q (computed at the three digit SIC level), with a dummy for business
group aﬃliation. We control for potential biases by including the interaction of these
two proxies with various firm and industry characteristics. Our results are reported in
Table 9 and show a robust positive and significant eﬀect of both interaction terms in
all diﬀerent specifications.
5.2.1. The eﬀect of liquidity
In a study on Japanese business groups (keiretsu), Hoshi et al. (1991) find that invest-
ment is less sensitive to liquidity for aﬃliated firms. They find that the availability
of internal funds is an important determinant of investment in a capital market with
asymmetric information. In this section, we want to test whether a similar relation
holds regarding innovation in European business groups. Namely, we examine whether
the eﬀect of liquidity on innovation is weaker for aﬃliated firms. Our proxy for liquidity
is the lagged ratio of cash flows to sales. Since the firm’s cash flows may be aﬀected
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by intra-group loans, we use an income statement measure of cash flows: net income
plus depreciation.12
Table 10 summarizes the results of our estimation. In column 1 we estimate the
pooled eﬀect of liquidity, which is positive and significant. In columns 2-3 and 4-5, we
estimate this eﬀect separately for aﬃliates versus standalones and small groups versus
large groups, respectively. The eﬀect of liquidity on innovation is much stronger for
standalones and small groups, as expected under the internal capital markets hypoth-
esis. For example, the liquidity coeﬃcient is 0.019 and not significant for aﬃliates of
large groups and 0.115 and significant at the 1 percent level for standalones and small
groups.
6. Discussion
Our findings in this paper suggest that business groups foster innovation via internal
capital markets. This result is especially interesting in light of recent findings by Seru
(2007), who reports that ineﬃciencies in the internal capital market of US conglom-
erates stifle innovation. These counter results call for a discussion of three questions.
First, why would the business group internal capital market be more eﬃcient for inno-
vation than the conglomerate internal capital market? Second, if indeed the business
group internal capital market is more eﬃcient, why are business groups not common
in the US? Third, why are not all innovating firms in Europe aﬃliated with business
groups (what is the trade-oﬀ)?
6.1. Innovation in conglomerates vs. business groups
Seru (2007) describes the R&D investment decision in a conglomerate. Understanding
the source of ineﬃciencies in a conglomerate can help us explain why the business
group internal capital market is more eﬃcient. Seru considers a conglomerate with
multiple divisions, where the headquarters centrally allocates the budget across the
divisions. The agency problem between the headquarters, who acts to maximize firm
12Another reason for using this measure is that private European firms do not file cash flow state-
ments.
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value, and the division managers, who seek to maximize their division’s budget, leads to
ineﬃcient allocation of capital and less innovation. The division managers hold valuable
information about the status of the project, but have no incentive to truthfully reveal it
to the headquarters, since then resources will be reallocated. Since more novel projects
are associated with higher degree of asymmetric information between the headquarters
and the division manager, risky projects (above a certain threshold) would not be
financed ex ante. The intuition is that the headquarters rejects novel projects since it
will not be able to evaluate the project and optimally decide whether to shut it down
or continue with its funding.
The agency problem is embedded in the ex-post commitment problem. The head-
quarters cannot commit not to transfer funds from one division to the other. In contrast
to conglomerates, such agency problems do not arise in business groups due to their
diﬀerent structure. Business groups are composed of legally independent companies
which often have minority shareholders.
There are two major benefits of the business group structure relative to a con-
glomerate. First, in a business group, the ultimate owner cannot shift funds from one
company to the other at no cost because she would be expropriating the rights of the
minority shareholders. The legal boundaries in a business group mitigate the ex-post
commitment problem of a conglomerate. The boundaries generate a legal commitment
of the ultimate owner not to shift fund in the middle of a project.13 Conglomerates
can try to mimic this structure by decentralizing their budget. Indeed, Seru (2007)
reports that conglomerates that decentralized their budget to the divisions are able to
mitigate the ineﬃciencies.
Second, the legal boundaries between diﬀerent members of the business groups
enable the group members to sign enforceable contracts with each other. This means
that instead of ineﬃcient reallocation of funds, the business group could utilize its
internal capital markets using intra-group lending contracts. For example, a cash-rich
company with little investment opportunities (e.g. utility and insurance companies)
13Even if in some cases the diversion of funds between two firms in the same group is legal (Johnson
et al. (2000)), there is a cost associated with such action (Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006)). For
example, there is a waste involved in the diversion when the ultimate owner tries to shift the funds in
sophisticated ways so the minority shareholders would not notice it.
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could lend funds to other firms in the group which are cash-constrained but have better
investment opportunities. Since the two companies are two diﬀerent legal entities, the
contract is enforceable by court.
6.2. Business groups in the US
If business groups are better in facilitating innovation, then why are they not prevalent
in the US today? Business groups were common in the US until the 1930’s (Morck
(2005)), but the American tax reform of the 1930’s disentangled business groups. The
Roosevelt administration believed that business groups facilitate governance problems,
tax avoidance, market power, and dangerously concentrate political influence. In reac-
tion, the American Congress enacted inter-corporate dividend taxes, all but abolished
consolidated tax filing for business groups, eliminated capital gains taxes on liquidated
controlled subsidiaries, and explicitly banned large pyramidal groups from controlling
public utilities companies. The explicit goal of these and other policies was to break
up large US business groups.
We explored the current European laws for similar rules regarding pyramidal busi-
ness groups. We found that the European laws concerning inter-company dividend
tax, consolidated tax returns, and capital gains tax are diﬀerent from those in the US
and impose lower costs on business groups. In addition, we did not encounter any
explicit restriction on utilities companies in European business group. Hence, legal
and tax diﬀerences between Europe and the US lead to these diﬀerences in ownership
structures. Appendix B summarizes these main legal diﬀerences within Europe and
between Europe and the US.
6.3. What is the cost of business group aﬃliation?
If business groups facilitate innovation, why are not all innovating European firms aﬃl-
iated with business groups? What is the cost associated with business group aﬃliation
from the perspective of a standalone firm?
Business group aﬃliation may be costly for the owners of a standalone firm. Sup-
pose, for example, that an entrepreneur forms a start-up company and that she realizes
the potential benefits from business group aﬃliation for a risky and cash-constrained
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firm. Assuming that the entrepreneur has private benefits of control (Grossman and
Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988)), she faces a trade-oﬀ between the benefit of the
business group internal capital market and the cost of losing control. In order to join a
business group, founders of standalone firms have to sell a significant amount of equity
holdings and give up their control. Therefore, for some entrepreneurs, it is optimal not
to join a business group.
7. Alternative Hypotheses
In the previous section, we provide robust empirical findings supporting the theoretical
prediction that the business group internal capital market positively aﬀects innovation.
In this section, we test several alternative hypotheses for our results. While alternative
hypotheses may explain some of the diﬀerences between the number of patents of
aﬃliated firms and standalones, we find that a significant part of this diﬀerence is
explained by the existence of a group internal capital market. For example, it is hard
to find an alternative hypothesis that would explain why aﬃliated firms systematically
innovate more in industries that rely more on external dependence, are more dispersed
and have a higher Tobin’s Q ratio.
7.1. Knowledge spillovers
In this paper, we focus on the eﬀect of group internal capital markets on innovation.
However, aﬃliated firms may benefit from knowledge spillovers from research of other
firms in the same group (‘internal R&D market’). Since the seminal works of Griliches
(1979) and Scherer (1982), an expanding literature has documented the positive ef-
fect of knowledge spillovers on innovative activity. Assuming that the frequency and
magnitude of knowledge spillovers is higher within the same group, this can lead to a
positive eﬀect of group aﬃliation on innovation. To test this hypothesis, we examine
the degree of similarity in the research conducted by firms in the same group. Under
the knowledge spillovers hypothesis, we would expect firms in the same group to have
similar R&D focus. For this purpose, we follow Jaﬀe (1986) and compute a measure of
technological similarity between firm pairs which is based on the extent to which two
firms patent in the same technology fields. The research similarity index for each pair
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of firms (i and j) is computed in the following way:
TECij =
(TiT
/
j )
(TiT
/
i )
1
2 (TjT
/
j )
1
2
(7.1)
where T is a vector representing the firm’s share of patents in the four-digit technology
sectors. The technology space information is provided by the allocation of all patents
by the EPO into 623 diﬀerent technology classes (International Patent Classification).
We use the average share of patents per firm in each technology class over the period
1979 to 2004 to create the following vector for each firm: Ti = (Ti,1, Ti,2, ...Ti,426), where
Ti,m is the share of patents of firm i in technology class m. TECij is then the co-sinus
between vector i and j.
Intuitively, the technological similarity is computed as the co-sinus between vector
pairs that represent the distribution of firm patenting across four-digit technology fields.
A higher similarity of these vectors means the two firms are technologically closer to
one another. The average measure of technological similarity between a firm and other
firms in its group is 0.024. While it is significantly higher than the average technological
similarity between a firm and all firms outside its group (0.014), it is very close to zero
and does not indicate that knowledge spillovers are a key determinant of the group’s
innovation.
7.2. Quality of governance
Aﬃliated firms may benefit from better governance compared to standalones. For
example, all group aﬃliates have a dominant shareholder (the ultimate owner) who
monitors the company’s activity - including its innovation activity. However, a stand-
alone firm may have a dispersed ownership and thus, suﬀer from lack of monitoring
and a potential conflict of interests between the manager and the atomic sharehold-
ers. Alternatively, the controlling shareholder of a standalone firm may be reluctant
to invest in risky R&D activity since a large fraction of his wealth is invested in the
company (as opposed to the ultimate owner of a business group whose investment is
more diversified). We test this hypothesis by including two control variables in our
baseline specification: a block-holder dummy and an ownership concentration variable.
Our results are robust to these specifications.
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The diﬀerence in the scale and novelty of innovation between standalones and aﬃl-
iates may also be explained by family ownership. Most standalone firms are controlled
by an individual or a family. Cadbury (2000) claims that a family CEO focuses more
on the long-term compared to an unrelated chief executive. This may imply that family
firms invest more in R&D. However, a family CEO may have less expertise in innova-
tion compared to a professional CEO. We test this hypothesis by including a family
ownership dummy in our baseline specification. The family variable is negative and
insignificant, and the coeﬃcients of the group aﬃliation variables remain positive and
significant.
7.3. Multinationals
Group aﬃliates are more likely to be part of a multinational organization than stand-
alones. In fact, 95 percent of the multinational firms in our sample are group aﬃliated.
Multinationals are known to be diﬀerent than domestic firms across various dimensions.
For example, Bloom et al. (2007) show that firms aﬃliated with multinational organi-
zations are more likely to invest in ‘soft’ innovation such as information communication
technologies. In case multinationals are also better in innovating than domiciles, the
group dummy may be capturing this eﬀect. To control for this, we include a multi-
national dummy in our baseline regression. A firm is defined as a multinational if
its ultimate owner is from a diﬀerent country than the firm itself. We do not find a
significant eﬀect of multinationals and the group aﬃliation variables remain robust.
8. Conclusion
This paper uses a novel dataset including ownership structure, financial reports, patent-
ing, and academic publications to study the eﬀect of group aﬃliation on innovation.
Our results indicate that group aﬃliation has a strong positive eﬀect on innovation. We
find that aﬃliates of large groups patent more than standalones or aﬃliates of small
groups, controlling for size and other observable characteristics. Aﬃliates of large
groups also conduct more novel innovations, as measured by the number of patent
citations and academic publications. The patents of large-group aﬃliates have greater
impact on productivity than those of standalones or aﬃliates of small groups.
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Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the group internal capital
market is a key channel through which group aﬃliation positively aﬀects innovation.
We show that the eﬀect of group aﬃliation is more pronounced in industries that rely
more on external funding and have a higher level of information asymmetry. Moreover,
the eﬀect of liquidity on innovation is much weaker for aﬃliates of large groups than
for standalones and aﬃliates of small groups.
The results presented in this paper contribute to the recent debate on the eﬀect of
ownership structure and internal capital market on innovation. Seru (2007) finds that
US conglomerates stifle innovation due to agency problems that lead to ineﬃciencies
in their internal capital markets. Morck (2005) claims that conglomerates are more
common than business groups in the US as a result of legal barriers to the creation
of business groups introduces in the 1940’s. We show that in Europe, where such
legal barriers do not exist, most innovating firms choose to form business groups and
that these groups (especially the larger ones) foster the scale and novelty of corporate
innovation. We explain how fundamental diﬀerences between the structure of business
groups and conglomerates may lead to more eﬃcient internal capital markets in business
groups.
Our findings indicate that in an economy with both business groups and standalone
firms, aﬃliates are more innovative than standalones. We do not claim, however, that
business groups necessarily increase the aggregate level of innovation in the economy.
In fact, business groups may have a negative eﬀect on competition, which would, in
turn, lead to a negative eﬀect on the aggregate level of innovation. We leave the analysis
of the macro implications of business groups to future research.
27
References
Almeida, Heitor, and Daniel Wolfenzon. 2006. “A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership
and Family Business Groups”. Journal of Finance 61, 2637-2680.
Bloom, Nicholas, Raﬀaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen. 2007. “Americans do I.T.
Better: US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle”. Working paper.
Blundell, Richard, Rachel Griﬃth, and John Van Reenen. 1999. “Market Shares,
Market Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms”. Review of
Economic Studies 66, 529-554.
Blundell, Richard, Rachel Griﬃth, and Frank Windmeijer. 2002. “Individual Eﬀects
and Dynamic Feedback in Count Data Models”. Journal of Econometrics 108, 113-131.
Cadbury, Adrian. 2000. “Family Firms and their Governance: Creating Tomorrow’s
Company from Today’s”. London: Egon Zehnder International.
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm”. Economica 4, 386-405.
Cockburn, Iain and Rebecca M. Henderson. 1998 “Absorptive Capacity, Coauthoring
Behavior, and the Organization of Research in Drug Discovery”. Journal of Industrial
Economics 46(2), 157-182
Faccio, Mara, and Larry H.P. Lang. 2002. “The Ultimate Ownership of Western
European Corporations”. Journal of Financial Economics 65, 365-395.
Gompers, Paul A. 1995. “Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture
Capital”. Journal of Finance 50(5), 1461-1489.
Greenwald, Bruce, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Andrew Weiss. 1984. “Informational Imper-
fections in the Capital markets and Macro-Economic Fluctuations”. American Eco-
nomic Review 74(1), 194-199.
Griliches, Zvi. 1979. “Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Develop-
ment to Productivity Growth”. Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 92-116.
Griliches, Zvi. 1990. “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey”. Journal
of Economic Literature 28, 1661-1707.
28
Griliches, Zvi. 1998. “R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence”. The
University of Chicago Press.
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. 1988. “One Share-One Vote and the Market
for Corporate Control”. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 175-202.
Guedj, Ilan and David S. Scharfstein. 2004. “Organizational Scope and Investment:
Evidence from the Drug Development Strategies and Performance of Biopharmaceuti-
cal Firms”. Working paper.
Guedj, Ilan. 2006. “Ownership vs. Contract: How Vertical Integration Aﬀects Invest-
ment Decisions in Pharmaceutical R&D”. Working paper.
Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam Jaﬀe, and Manuel Trajtenberg. 2005. “Market Value and
Patent Citations”. The Rand Journal of Economics 36, 16-38.
Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv. 1988. “Corporate Control Contests and Capital
Structure”. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 55-88.
Hausman, Jerry, Bronwyn H. Hall, and Zvi Griliches. 1984. “Econometric Models for
Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship”. Econometrica
52(4), 909-938.
Himmelberg, Charles and Bruce Petersen. 1994. “R&D and Internal Finance: A Panel
Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries”. Review of Economics and Statistics
76(1), 38-51.
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap and David Scharfstein. 1991. “Corporate Structure,
Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups”. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 106(1), 33-60.
Jaﬀe, Adam B. 1986. “Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence
from Firms’ Patents, Profits, and Market Value”. American Economic Review 76(5),
984-1001.
Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer.
2000. “Tunneling”. American Economic Review 90, 22-27.
29
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 1999. “Corporate
Ownership around the World”. Journal of Finance 54(2), 471-517.
Lee, Scott D. 1992. “Management buyout proposals and inside information” Journal
of Finance 47, 1061-79.
Morck, Randall. 2005. “How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double-
Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy”. Tax
Policy and the Economy 19, 135-179.
Mullainathan,Sendhil and David Scharfstein. 2001. “Do Firm Boundaries Matter?”.
The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 91, 195—199.
Myers, Stewart and Nicholal S. Majluf. 1984. “Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions when Firms have Information that Investors Do Not Have”. Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics 13, 187-221.
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales. 1998. “Financial Dependence and Growth”.
American Economic Review 88, 559-586.
Scherer, Frederick M. 1982. “Inter-Industry Technology Flows in the United States”.
Research Policy 11, 227-245.
Seru, Amit. 2007. “Do Conglomerates Stifle Innovation?”. Working paper, University
of Chicago.
Trajtenberg, Manuel. 1990. “A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the
Value of Innovations”. The Rand Journal of Economics 21(1), 172-187
30
31
Figure 1 - Innovation in the Nasi And Agnelli Business Group
Ultimate Owner
Investment Company (apex):
Innovating Firms:
Non-Innovating Firms:
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(IT)
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LIGHTING (DE)
AUTOMOTIVE
LIGHTING (IT)
AUTOMOTIVE
LIGHTING (FR)
MAGNETI
MARELLI ELEC 
(FR)
FIAT AUTO (IT)
IFIL
FINANZIARIA
NASI AND
AGNELLI 
FAMILIES
Assets: $116M
# of patents: 18
Assets: $55M 
# of patents: 4
Group Assets: $172,453M
Group Cash flow: $2,116M
Assets: $354M
# of patents: 11
Assets: $20M
# of patents: 89
Assets: $582M
# of patents: 1
Assets: $415M
# of patents: 87
Assets: $227M 
# of patents: 3
Assets: $12,601M 
# of patents: 582
MAGNETI
MARELLI (FR)
177 subsidiaries
Main activity: Manufacture of motor vehicles
186 firms organized in 9 ownership layers.
Notes: This figure describes the innovation activity in an Italian business group controlled by the Nasi and Agnelli families. The group structure is 
based on ownership information from the complete Amadeus database for 2004. The group structure was generated based on the algorithm 
introduced in section 2. Total assets and cash flows are updated for the last financial statement available in Amadeus (typically 2004). The number of 
patents is updated for 2005.
Mean number of patents per firm-year across countries
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Notes:  This figure describes the difference in the mean number of patents between standalone firms, firms that belong to medium-size business groups (groups with les
than 50 affiliates), and firms that belong to large groups (groups with more than 50 affiliates) across different European countries from 1995 to 2004. Patents are 
matched from the European Patent Office. The sample includes only firms with at least one patent between 1979 and 2004.
Mean number of citations received per patent per firm-year across countries
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Notes:  This figure describes the difference in the mean number of citations per patent between standalone firms, firms that belong to medium-size business groups 
(groups with less than 50 affiliates), and firms that belong to large groups (groups with more than 50 affiliates) across different European countries from 1995 to 2004. 
Patents are matched from the European Patent Office. The sample includes only firms with at least one patent between 1979 and 2004.
Figure 2: Innovation across business group size and countries
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Figure 3 - Difference in patenting across industry measures
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Notes: This figure describes the difference in the mean number of patents between business group affiliates and standalone firms across deciles of various
industry measures. All Variables (except Productivity Growth Dispersion) are computed at the three-digit SIC level based on Compustat firms in the period
1980-2004. Productivity Growth Dispersion (PGD) is computed from the complete Amadeus dataset in the period 1995-2004. External Finance Dependence is
defined as the ratio between capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations and capital expenditures. External Equity Dependence is defined as the net
amount of equity issued over capital expenditures. PGD is defined as the industry-country mean of the difference in labor productivity growth between the
90th and 10th percentiles. Average Tobin's Q is the industry average of the ration between market value and the book value of capital.
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Variable # firms # Obs Mean Std. Dev. 10th 50th 90th
# patents EPO (annual) 12,389 60,827 0.44 2.62 0 0 1
Patents stock 12,389 60,827 3.99 18.39 0 1 6.8
# academic publications (annual) 1,094 5,717 0.82 4.49 0 0 2
Academic publicatiosn stock 1,094 5,717 3.52 18.45 0 0.61 5.93
Sales (`000) 12,389 60,827 147,918 1,136,312 555 16,303 202,525
Employess 11,228 48,995 538 3,037 7 109 982
Total Assets (`000) 9,800 54,785 148,413 891,783 543 10,957 188,945
Age 11,093 55,630 26 24 5 19 58
Sales Growth 10,982 48,803 0.09 0.34 -0.24 0.06 0.48
Capital (`000) 9,800 54,785 72,948 570,398 71 2,468 68,751
Capital/Employee (`000) 8,579 43,944 715 45,206 8 36 185
Sales/Employee (`000) 11,228 48,995 437 5,747 80 178 492
Cash Flow ('000) 9,489 44,083 17,563 161,702 63 1,050 18,629
Variable # firms # Groups Mean Std. Dev. 10st 50th 90th
# of affiliates in a group 6,289 4,970 72 164 2 12 200
Sales (millions) 6,289 4,970 12,195 51,450 17 394 18,861
Employees 5,651 4,445 27,233 97,479 110 1,701 62,873
Cash flow (millions) 5,066 3,977 988 4,418 0.6 24 1,705
Patents stock 6,289 4,970 15 128 0.1 1 15
Industry concentration 6,181 4,868 0.26 0.27 0.03 0.17 0.5
Country concentration 6,287 4,970 0.46 0.39 0.05 0.33 1
PANEL A: FIRM-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS
Distribution
TABLE 1-
PANEL B: BUSINESS GROUP CHARACTERISTICS
Distribution
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR INNOVATING FIRMS
Notes: These tables provide summary statistics both at the firm level and at the group level for our sample period: 1995-
2004. Panel A includes all observations in the estimation sample firms (firms with at least one granted patent application in
the period 1979-2004) and provides information on key firm characteristics. Patents data are taken from the European
Patent Office (EPO). Academic publications include articles published in "hard" sciences journals by matching the name of
the firm to the address field in the complete ISI Web of Science database (which includes about 25 million publications).
Patent stock and academic publications stock are computed using the perpetual inventory method using a depreciation
rate of 15 percent. Capital is fixed-assets and cash flow is defined as net income plus depreciation. Age is the number of
years since the date of incorporation. Panel B provides information on key business group variables which are computed
from the complete Amadeus database (about a million firms). Industry concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) of concentration over the number of different three-digit industry SIC in which firms in the group operate. Country
concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentration over the number of different countries in the group.
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Variable # firms Mean 50th # firms Mean 50th
# patents EPO (annual) 6,289 0.57 0 - - -
Sales (`000) 6,289 211,021 29,223 24,680 32,416 5,736
Employess 5,741 677 176 24,680 116 28
Total Assets 5,289 205,362 22,599 16,348 32,725 4,277
Age 5,910 29 22 22,699 19 14
Sales Growth 5,552 0.09 0.06 20,940 0.12 0.09
Capital (`000) 5,289 101,071 5,569 16,348 15,504 728
Capital/Employee (`000) 4,690 572 39 16,348 485 21
Sales/Employee (`000) 5,741 496 187 24,680 987 211
Cash Flow (`000) 5,133 18,056 1,429 15,862 3,215 271
Variable # firms Mean 50th # firms Mean 50th
# patents EPO (annual) 6,100 0.31 0 - - -
Sales (`000) 6,100 82,860 6,723 45,268 7,426 2,724
Employess 5,487 393 44 45,268 32 15
Total Assets 4,511 81,642 3,942 36,809 6,242 1,730
Age 5,183 23 17 37,250 17 14
Sales Growth 5,430 0.09 0.06 35,373 0.12 0.09
Capital (`000) 4,511 39,975 853 36,808 2,524 316
Capital/Employee (`000) 3,889 887 33 36,808 141 21
Sales/Employee (`000) 5,487 375 165 45,268 496 206
Cash Flow (`000) 4,356 16,982 222 36,082 401 107
SELECTION INTO PATENTING: AFFILIATES VERSUS STANDALONES
TABLE 2-
Notes: These tables provide summary statistics for group affiliates (Panel A) and standalones (Panel B)
during our sample period: 1995-2004. Each panel divides the firms into innovating and non-innovating. Non-
innovating firms are selected randomly as 10 percent of the complete sample of firms in each country that
were not matched to the patent data in the EPO or USPTO, but that report employment and have annual
sales of at least $1M. Patents data are taken from the European Patent Office (EPO). Capital is fixed-assets
and cash flow is defined as net income plus depreciation. Age is the number of years since the date of
incorporation. 
PANEL A: GROUP AFFILIATES
PANEL B: STANDALONES
Non-innovatingInnovating
Innovating Non-innovating
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Variable # industries Mean Std. Dev. 10st 50th 90th
External Finance Dependence 178 1.02 0.71 0.34 0.87 1.88
External Equity Dependence 178 1.21 1.06 0.18 1.00 2.43
Investment Intensity 178 0.66 1.35 0.25 0.45 0.88
Productivity Growth Dispersion 178 0.39 0.16 0.25 0.35 0.64
Average Tobin's Q 178 2.10 1.14 1.04 1.76 3.85
Lerner Index 178 0.86 2.91 0.88 1.03 1.48
R&D/Sales 178 0.44 2.82 0 0.10 0.41
External Finance 
Dependence
External Equity 
Dependence
Investment 
Intensity
Productivity Growth 
Dispersion Average Tobin's Q Lerner Index R&D/Sales
External Finance Dependence 1.000
External Equity Dependence 0.823 1.000
Investment Intensity 0.073 0.196 1.000
Productivity Growth Dispersion 0.128 0.224 0.218 1.000
Average Tobin's Q 0.388 0.529 0.021 0.113 1.000
Lerner Index 0.129 0.150 0.068 0.189 0.023 1.000
R&D/Sales 0.204 0.179 -0.019 -0.049 0.118 0.011 1.000
Notes: These tables report the summary statistics of the key industry variables. All Variables (except Productivity Growth Dispersion) are computed at the three-digit SIC level
based on Compustat firms in the period 1980-2004. Productivity Growth Dispersion (PGD) is computed from the complete Amadeus dataset in the period 1995-2004. External
Finance Dependence is defined as the ratio between capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations and capital expenditures. External Equity Dependence is defined as
the net amount of equity issued over capital expenditures. Investment Intensity is the ratio between capital expenditures and net property plant and equipment. PGD is defined
as the industry-country mean of the difference in labour productivity growth between the 90th and 10th percentiles. Average Tobin's Q is the industry average of the ration
between market value and the book value of capital. Panel A describes the distribution of the industry variables and Panel B shows the correlation matrix between the variables.
PANEL B: CORRELATIONS MATRIX
TABLE 3-
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR INDUSTRY VARIABLES
Distribution
PANEL A: DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable:
Group affiliation: All All All All Only affiliates All All All All Only affiliates
Business Group Dummy 0.256*** 0.295***
(0.049) (0.046)
log(Group's # of firms) 0.097*** 0.107***
(0.016) (0.014)
Small Group Dummy (2≤# of firms≤3) 0.103 0.141*** 0.095 0.102**
(0.064) (0.050) (0.061) (0.047)
Medium Group Dummy (4≤# of firms≤50) 0.260*** 0.276*** 0.163** 0.329*** 0.254*** 0.208***
(0.058) (0.042) (0.067) (0.053) (0.040) (0.063)
Large Group Dummy (# of firms>50) 0.418*** 0.382*** 0.303*** 0.468*** 0.329*** 0.321***
(0.081) (0.055) (0.087) (0.075) (0.051) (0.081)
log(Sales)t-1 0.349*** 0.330*** 0.338*** 0.239*** 0.345*** 0.333*** 0.314*** 0.319*** 0.244*** 0.349***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019)
Pre-sample mean 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Patentst-1 0.101*** 0.107***
(0.011) (0.012)
Country dummies (11) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC dummies (178) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (9) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Psedu Likelihood -35,546.1 -35,498.5 -35,524.5 -34,300.6 -22,532.9 -49,445.6 -49,378.3 -49,406.8 -47,655.6 -31,764.1
Over-dispersion (Alpha) 3.184 3.155 3.168 2.298 2.298 3.731 3.696 3.711 2.717 2.717
(0.124) (0.118) (0.119) (0.075) (0.075) (0.127) (0.121) (0.124) (0.076) (0.076)
Observations 60,827 60,827 60,827 60,827 33,798 75,989 75,989 75,989 75,989 42,367
Number of firms 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 6,289 15,395 15,395 15,395 15,395 7,906
TABLE 4- 
GROUP AFFILIATION AND INNOVATION (NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATION)
# Patents from the EPO # Patents from the EPO and the USPTO
Notes: This table reports the results of negative binomial regressions that examine the effect of business group affiliation on patents. The dependent variable in
columns 1-5 is the firm-year number of patents granted by the European Patent Office. The dependent variable in column 6-10 includes also the number of patents by
European firms granted by the United States Patents and Trademarks Office (USPTO). In order to avoid double counting of patents on the same invention (granted
both in the EPO and the USPTO), we use the Triadic database published by the OECD and exclude USPTO patents that appear in the same family as an EPO patent
(where a family is a set of patents that cover the same invention). Data is for the period 1995 to 2004. A firm belongs to a business group (i.e., business group dummy
equals 1) if its ultimate owner controls at least one additional firm. The number of firms in a group includes all firms in the ownership data of Amadeus (even if these
firms do not innovate or do not report accounting information). Following the “pre-sample mean scaling approach” of Blundell et al. (1999), our pre-sample fixed-effect is
the number of patents a firm had from 1979 until the first year it appeared in our sample. A dummy is included for observations where the pre-sample mean is zero.
Country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial
correlation through clustering by firm. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation:
Dependent variable:
Business Group Dummy 0.261*** 0.574***
(0.075) (0.203)
log(Group's # of firms) 0.106*** 0.194***
(0.021) (0.043)
Small Group Dummy (2≤# of firms≤3) -0.059 0.379
(0.105) (0.261)
Medium Group Dummy (4≤# of firms≤50) 0.374*** 0.467**
(0.086) (0.240)
Large Group Dummy (# of firms>50) 0.395*** 0.964***
(0.112) (0.248)
log(Sales)t-1 0.317*** 0.298*** 0.306*** 0.209*** 0.178*** 0.192***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040)
Pre-sample mean 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 1.924*** 1.869*** 1.887***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.675) (0.664) (0.649)
Country dummies (11) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC dummies (178) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (9) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Psedu Likelihood -36,154.2 -36,115.6 -36,116.6 -5,808.2 -5,793.2 -5,796.5
Over-dispersion (Alpha) 6.310 6.274 6.279 19.455 19.186 19.260
(0.240) (0.236) (0.236) (1.907) (1.879) (1.877)
Observations 60,827 60,827 60,827 60,827 60,827 60,827
Number of firms 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389 12,389
GROUP AFFILIATION AND THE QUALITY OF INNOVATION 
TABLE 5- 
Citations-weighted # patents Citations-weighted # publications
Negative Binomial
Notes: This table examines the effect of group affiliation on the quality of innovation using two dependent variables:
citations-weighted number of EPO patents (columns 1-3), and citations-weighted number of publications (columns 4-
6). Academic publications include articles published in "hard" sciences journals by matching the name of the firm to
the address field in the complete ISI Web of Science database (which includes about 25 million publications). Data is
for the period 1995 to 2004. A firm belongs to a business group (i.e., business group dummy equals 1) if its ultimate
owner controls at least one additional firm. The number of firms in a group includes all firms in the ownership data of
Amadeus (even if these firms do not innovate or do not report accounting information). Following the “pre-sample
mean scaling approach” of Blundell et al. (1999), our pre-sample fixed-effect is the number of patents a firm had from
1979 until the first year it appeared in our sample. A dummy is included for observations where the pre-sample mean
is zero. Country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Group affiliation: Only affiliates Only affiliates Only standalone
Group's size 
≥4
Group's size 
<4 
Group's size 
>50
Group's size 
≤50
Group's size 
>50
Group's size 
≤50
log(Group's # of firms) 0.086***
0.006
log(Patents Stock)t-1 0.056*** 0.067*** 0.053*** 0.077*** 0.044*** 0.078*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.062***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.025) (0.021)
Marginal effect of Patents Stockt-1 2,466.9    3,175.9    1,540.9    3,835.9    1,217.4    5,841.4    1,495.6    4,343.6    1,717.1    
log(Employees)t-1 0.726*** 0.733*** 0.738*** 0.712*** 0.754*** 0.639*** 0.746*** 0.303*** 0.314***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015) (0.036) (0.013) (0.054) (0.038)
log(Capital)t-1 0.206*** 0.216*** 0.179*** 0.216*** 0.186*** 0.259*** 0.187*** 0.146*** 0.053**
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.025) (0.009) (0.035) (0.027)
Marginal effect of Capitalt-1 1,799.8    1,320.6    1,960.7    1,158.9    1,886.3    1257.92 1485.26 281.70 492.44
Country dummies (11) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC dummies (178) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (9) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects No No No No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.861 0.828 0.836 0.818 0.831 0.850 0.844 0.954 0.923
Observations 36,456 22,284 14,172 17,800 18,656 6,706 29,750 6,706 29,750
Number of firms 7890 4,358 3,532 3,421 4,469 1,240 6,650 1,240 6,650
GROUP AFFILIATION AND THE QUALITY OF INNOVATION 
TABLE 6- 
Dependent variable: log(Sales). OLS estimation
Notes: This table examines the effect of group affiliation on the quality of innovation by analyzing the effect of patents stock on firm productivity.
Patents stock is computed using the perpetual inventory method using a depreciation rate of 15 percent. The marginal return to patent stock is
computed as the elasticity multiplied by sales over patent stock, evaluated at the mean. A firm belongs to a business group (i.e., business group
dummy equals 1) if its ultimate owner controls at least one additional firm. The number of firms in a group includes all firms in the ownership data of
Amadeus (even if these firms do not innovate or do not report accounting information). Capital is defined as fixed-assets. Country, industry, and year
fixed effects are included in all regressions. Firm fixed-effects are included in columns 8-9. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
Group affiliation: All All All Only affiliates All All All Only affiliates
Business Group Dummy 0.512*** 0.306***
(0.113) (0.020)
log(Group's # of firms) 0.170*** 0.103** 0.107*** 0.055***
(0.030) (0.035) (0.007) (0.009)
Small Group Dummy (2≤# of firms≤3) 0.182 0.157***
(0.146) (0.027)
Medium Group Dummy (4≤# of firms≤50) 0.679*** 0.356***
(0.131) (0.024)
Large Group Dummy (# of firms>50) 0.714*** 0.549***
(0.166) (0.038)
log(Sales)t-1 0.674*** 0.649*** 0.637*** 0.702*** 0.078*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.181***
(0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Country dummies (11) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC dummies (178) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Psedu Likelihood -3,477.9 -3,471.1 -3,469.9 -2,368.4 -14,851.3 -14,789.3 -14,803.9 -6875.5
Over-dispersion (Alpha) 6.835 6.794 6.822 5.981 - - - -
(0.783) (0.779) (0.785) (0.692)
Observations 55,597 55,597 55,597 21,760 55,597 55,597 55,597 21,760
TABLE 7- 
GROUP AFFILIATION AND INNOVATION: CROSS-SECTIONAL INCLUDING NON-INNOVATING FIRMS
Dummy for innovating (Probit)# Patents from the EPO (Negative Binomial)
Notes: This table reports the results of negative binomial (columns 1-4) and Probit (columns 5-8) regressions that examine the effect of
business group affiliation on patents for a large sample including also non-innovating firms. Non-innovating firms are selected randomly as 10
percent of the complete sample of firms in each country that were not matched to the patent data in the EPO or USPTO, but that report
employment and have annual sales of at least $1M. The estimation sample is cross-sectional for the year 2003. The dependent variable in
columns 1-4 is the firm-year number of patents granted by the European Patent Office. The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is a dummy that
receives the value of 1 for innovating firm and zero otherwise. A firm belongs to a business group (i.e., business group dummy equals 1) if its
ultimate owner controls at least one additional firm. The number of firms in a group includes all firms in the ownership data of Amadeus (even if
these firms do not innovate or do not report accounting information). Country and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard
errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by ultimate owner. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dummy for business group 0.075 0.325 0.199 0.126* -0.326 -0.924 0.223*** 0.228 0.244
(0.091) (0.941) (0.956) (0.073) (0.982) (1.063) (0.006) (0.961) (1.031)
Business Group Dummy × 
External Dependence
0.161*** 
(0.060)
0.139*** 
(0.051)
0.151*** 
(0.057)
0.118*** 
(0.043)
0.136*** 
(0.042)
0.162*** 
(0.046)
0.127** 
(0.065)
0.127** 
(0.066)
0.103** 
(0.056)
Contros for other industry 
characteristics
Business Group Dummy × 
Industry R&D/Sales
-0.009 
(0.012)
-0.019 
(0.022)
-0.009 
(0.012)
-0.023** 
(0.011)
0.003 
(0.012)
-0.008 
(0.012)
Business Group Dummy × 
Industry Lerner Index
-0.194 
(0.968)
-0.165 
(0.986)
0.464 
(0.999)
0.977 
(1.084)
0.002 
(0.985) -0.068 (1.061)
Contros for other firm 
characteristics
log(Sales)t-1 × External 
Dependence
-0.017 
(0.011)
-0.016* 
(0.009)
-0.019 
(0.022)
-0.017** 
(0.008)
-0.017** 
(0.008)
0.002 
(0.012)
-0.024** 
(0.008)
-0.025*** 
(0.009)
0.001 
(0.021)
log(Cash Flow)t-1 × External 
Dependence
0.072** 
(0.029)
-0.014 
(0.015)
-0.010 
(0.011)
log(Capital)t-1 × External 
Dependence
-0.009 
(0.017)
-0.013 
(0.015)
-0.011 
(0.014)
log(Sales)t-1 0.355*** 0.357*** 0.122*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.060** 0.024** 0.258*** 0.063**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.009) (0.015) (0.027)
log(Cash Flow)t-1 0.072** 0.129*** 0.128***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.018)
log(Capital)t-1 0.069** 0.075*** 0.065***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.019)
Pre-sample fixed-effect 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.004***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Patentst-1 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.118*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.113*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.112***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Country dummies (11) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC dummies (110) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (9) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Psedu Likelihood -29,018.1 -27,477.9 -14,819.0 -28,023.6 -27,474.4 -14,927.0 -28,027.9 -27,478.4 -14,934.7 
Over-dispersion (Alpha) 3.043 2.203 1.323 2.185 2.202 1.305 2.185 2.200 1.314
(0.139) (0.086) (0.066) (0.085) (0.087) (0.065) (0.085) (0.086) (0.065)
Observations 60,827 60,827 29,982 60,827 60,827 29,982 60,827 60,827 29,982
Number of firms 12,389 12,389 7,315 12,389 12,389 7,315 12,389 12,389 7,315
TABLE 8- 
BUSINESS GROUPS AND INNOVATION: THE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE AND 
INVESTMENT INTENSITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NUMBER OF PATENTS (FIRM-YEAR)
External Finance Dependence External Equity Dependence Investment Intensiveness
Notes: This table reports the results of negative binomial regressions that examine the effect of external dependence and investment intensity on
patents. The dependent variable is the firm-year number of patents granted by the European Patent Office for the period 1995 to 2004. A firm belongs
to a business group if its ultimate owner controls at least one additional firm. External Finance Dependence, External Equity Dependence, and
Investment Intensity are computed as the average three-digit SIC level for the period 1980-2004 based on Compustat firms. External Finance
Dependence (columns 1-3) is defined as the ratio between capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations and capital expenditures. External
Equity Dependence (columns 4-6) is defined as the net amount of equity issued over capital expenditures. Investment Intensity (columns 7-9) is the
ratio between capital expenditures and net property plant and equipment. Lerner index is defined as one minus the average industry profit margin
(i.e., a higher Lerner index means stronger competition), based on the complete sample of Amadeus firms. Pre-sample fixed-effect is the number of
patents a firm had from 1979 until the first year it appeared in our sample. A dummy is included for observations where the pre-sample mean is zero.
Cash flow is defined as net income plus depreciation and capital is defined as fixed assets. Country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in all
regressions. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy for business group 0.008 -0.250 -0.585 0.097 -0.199 -0.505
(0.118) (1.249) (1.260) (0.095) (2.000) (2.134)
Business Group Dummy × 
Industry Asymetric Information
0.788*** 
(0.296)
0.850*** 
(0.379)
0.932** 
(0.408)
0.087** 
(0.037)
0.097*** 
(0.036)
0.091** 
(0.041)
Contros for other industry 
characteristics
Business Group Dummy × 
Industry R&D/Sales
0.004 
(0.011)
-0.006 
(0.012)
-0.005 
(0.012)
-0.015 
(0.012)
Business Group Dummy × 
Industry Lerner Index
0.239 
(1.196)
0.475 
(0.120)
0.289 
(2.031)
0.512 
(2.172)
Contros for other firm 
characteristics
log(Sales)t-1 × Industry Asymetric 
Information
-0.307*** 
(0.071)
-0.306*** 
(0.071)
-0.107
 (0.135)
-0.022*** 
(0.007)
-0.021*** 
(0.007)
-0.011 
(0.170)
log(Cash Flow)t-1 × Industry 
Asymetric Information
-0.037 
(0.116)
-0.003 
(0.014)
log(Capital)t-1 × Industry 
Asymetric Information
0.037
 (0.116)
-0.001 
(0.013)
log(Sales)t-1 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.139** 0.322*** 0.321*** 0.149***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.062) (0.025) (0.025) (0.050)
log(Cash Flow)t-1 0.176*** 0.103***
(0.047) (0.038)
log(Capital)t-1 0.044 0.056
(0.049) (0.036)
Pre-sample fixed-effect 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014)
Patentst-1 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.118*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.120***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Country dummies (11) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC dummies (110) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (9) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Psedu Likelihood -27,458.2 -27,457.9 -14,812.7 -23,444.0 -23,303.9 -12,686.9 
Over-dispersion (Alpha) 2.189 2.189 1.321 2.028 2.042 1.277
(0.087) (0.087) (0.065) (0.082) (0.083) (0.068)
Observations 60,827 60,827 29,982 60,827 60,827 29,982
Number of firms 12,389 12,389 7,315 12,389 12,389 7,315
Average Tobin's Q
TABLE 9- 
BUSINESS GROUPS AND INNOVATION: THE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY  ASYMETRIC INFORMATION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NUMBER OF PATENTS (FIRM-YEAR)
Productivity Growth Dispersion
Notes: This table reports the results of negative binomial regressions that examine the effect of asymmetric information on
patents. The dependent variable is the firm-year number of patents granted by the European Patent Office for the period 1995 to
2004. A firm belongs to a business group if its ultimate owner controls at least one additional firm. Our proxies for asymmetric
information are Productivity Growth Dispersion (columns 1-3) and average Tobin’s Q (columns 4-6). Productivity Growth
Dispersion is defined as the industry difference between the 90 and 10 percentiles of productivity growth averaged over the period
1995-2004, based on the complete sample of Amadeus firms. Average Tobin's Q is the industry average of the ratio between the
value of the firm and the book value of its tangible assets, based on US Compustat firms. Lerner index is defined as one minus the
average industry profit margin (i.e., a higher Lerner index means stronger competition), based on the complete sample of
Amadeus firms. Pre-sample fixed-effect is the number of patents a firm had from 1979 until the first year it appeared in our sample.
A dummy is included for observations where the pre-sample mean is zero. Cash flow is defined as net income plus depreciation
and capital is defined as fixed assets. Country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors (in
brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group affiliation/size: All Only affiliates Only standalone
Group's size 
≥4
Group's size 
<4 
Group's size 
≥4
Group's size 
<4 
Innovation: Innovating Innovating Innovating Innovating Innovating Also non-innovating
Also non-
innovating
log(Cash Flow)t-1 0.021*** 0.017* 0.045*** 0.019 0.115*** 0.124 0.254***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.027) (0.023) (0.082) (0.084)
log(Capital)t-1 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.081*** 0.069*** 0.096*** 0.309*** 0.403***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.072) (0.083)
Business Group Dummy 0.219***
(0.046)
log(Sales)t-1 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.059** 0.267*** 0.031
(0.020) (0.026) (0.032) (0.035) (0.027) (0.106) (0.129)
Pre-sample mean 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.003*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Patentst-1 0.117*** 0.105*** 0.124*** 0.102*** 0.133***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.024)
Country dummies (11) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Three-digit SIC dummies (178) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (9) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Psedu Likelihood -15,102.5 -10,208.4 -4,985.1 -8,290.2 -6,749.7 -950.2 -750.9
Over-dispersion (Alpha) 1.310 1.294 3.287 1.294 1.123 3.717 3.330
(0.065) (0.073) (0.329) (0.081) (0.096) (0.555) (0.958)
Observations 30,138 17,661 12,825 13,818 16,766 5,486 19,930
Number of firms 7,308 4,119 3,295 3,235 4,255 5,486 19,930
THE EFFECT OF LIQUIDITY
TABLE 10- 
Dependent variable: # Patents from the EPO. Negative Binomial estimation
Notes: This table reports the results of negative binomial regressions that examine the effect of liquidity on innovation.
The dependent variable is the firm-year number of patents granted by the European Patent Office. Data is for the period
1995 to 2004. Non-innovating firms are selected randomly as 10 percent of the complete sample of firms in each country
that were not matched to the patent data in the EPO or USPTO, but that report employment and have annual sales of at
least $1M. Cash flow is defined as net income plus depreciation and capital is defined as fixed assets. A firm belongs to a
business group (i.e., business group dummy equals 1) if its ultimate owner controls at least one additional firm. Following
the “pre-sample mean scaling approach” of Blundell et al. (1999), our pre-sample fixed-effect (columns 1-5) is the number
of patents a firm had from 1979 until the first year it appeared in our sample. A dummy is included for observations where
the pre-sample mean is zero. Country, industry, and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors (in
brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Determining business group aﬃliation
This section details the construction and output of our newly developed algorithm. The
purpose of the algorithm is to determine the structure of European business groups
based on the Amadeus ownership database. The algorithm consists of two parts: a
control-chain generator that constructs the ownership and control links between dif-
ferent European firms, and a name matching procedure that groups together firms
controlled by the same ultimate owner.
A.1.1. Control chain generator
Objective The Amadeus ownership database includes detailed information on the
percentage of ownership between European corporate shareholders and their European
subsidiaries. The data span virtually all European countries (including Eastern Eu-
rope). We develop an ownership algorithm that constructs the internal structure of
business groups based on these inter-company ownership links. The main benefits of
the algorithm are: (i) it constructs the ownership chains without relying on the (often
missing) information on whether an ownership link is direct or indirect,14 (ii) it com-
pletes missing ownership links by transitivity, (iii) it identifies cross-holdings, and (iv)
it handles complex ownership structures. These features allow us to develop robust
measures of business group characteristics (such as group size).
Input We include all ownership links from the Amadeus ownership database that
represent a control relation. For this, we make the following assumptions: for private
subsidiaries, a shareholder exerts control if its direct percentage of ownership is larger
than 50. For public firms, the percentage of direct ownership has to be larger than 20
to represent a control relation (since ownership is typically less concentrated in public
firms than in private firms).15
There are 843,390 direct ownership links that satisfy our control assumptions, where
406,379 shareholders control 843,124 subsidiaries. The average percentage of direct
ownership is 94.6 with a median of 100 (77 percent of the ownership links represent
a wholly-owned relation). There are 2,484 public subsidiaries. For these subsidiaries,
the average percentage of direct ownership is 53.6 with a median of 49 (only 1 percent
of these links represent a wholly-owned relation).
Description of the algorithm The algorithm follows three steps: (i) completes
missing ownership links, (ii) generates lists of all subsidiaries and parents for each
14Indirect ownership links are very common in our data. Suppose, for example, that firm A owns
60% of the shares of B and that B owns 60% of the shares of C. In this case, firm A has a direct
ownership of 60% in B and an indirect ownership of 36% in C.
15Similar assumption was made by La Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002).
company, and (iii) constructs the ownership chains bottom-up.16 To illustrate our
methodology, it would be useful to consider the following example. Suppose Figure
A.1 correctly describes the ownership structure of a business group. The ultimate
owner (for example, a family) at the apex of the group controls 7 public and private
firms. Amadeus provides detailed data on direct ownership links. Thus, our raw data
include the links A → D, B → F , C → G, and D → E. Note that the percentage
of ownership for the link C → G has to be larger than 20 (because firm G is public),
where for the percentage of ownership for all other links has to be larger than 50
(because the other subsidiaries are private). Because there is no information about
indirect ownership links, the link A → E is missing from the raw data. The first step
of the algorithm is to complete missing links. As we observe the ownership relations
A → D and D → E, our algorithm infers the ownership relation A → E. Note that
at this stage of the algorithm we still do not know whether the ownership relation is
direct or indirect (and if it is indirect, how many layers separate firm E from firm A).
The second step of the algorithm is to construct two lists for each firm: shareholders
and subsidiaries. This step saves valuable running time, which is especially important
when dealing with large scale ownership data. The following table is generated:
Firm Shareholder Subsidiary
A - D, E
B - F
C - G
D A E
E A, D -
F B -
G C -
Note that from step 1, we already know that firm A is a shareholder of firm E. Also,
because we assume the ultimate owner is a family, firms A, B, and C have no corporate
(European) shareholder. The third and final step of the algorithm is to construct the
structure of the group based on the above ownership relations. Because of the missing
links problem, our algorithm does not assume that an ownership relation is direct; the
only input the algorithm receives is the existence of the ownership relation. We start
with a firm that has no subsidiaries from the list generated in step 2. We illustrate the
procedure for firm E, which is the most interesting in this example. Firm E is placed
at the bottom of the ownership chain. Next, we move to the shareholder list of firm E.
It includes firms A and D. Starting arbitrary with A, place A above E. Proceeding
to firm D, there are three possibilities for its location: (i) D is above E and above
A; (ii) D is above E, but below A; (iii) D is above E, but not below neither above
A (diﬀerent ownership chain). For (i) to be the right structure, D has to appear in
the shareholder list of firm A. From step 2, we rule this out. For (ii) to be the right
16Unlike business groups in East Asia (such as the Japanese keiretsu), most European business
groups are organized in pyramids (Figure A.1). This means that interlocking shareholdings are not
common and, therefore, ownership chains can be constructed bottom-up.
Ultimate Owner
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Figure A.1: Example of a business group.
structure, D has to appear on the subsidiary list of firm A. From step 2, this holds.
Finally, for (iii) to be the right structure, A cannot appear on either the shareholder or
subsidiary lists of firm D. From step 2, this is ruled out. At the end of this procedure,
we have determined for each ownership chain the highest shareholder firm - we call this
firm the leading shareholder.
Our algorithm fails in the case of cross-holdings. A cross-holding is an ownership
structure where a shareholder is also a subsidiary of its own subsidiary. For example,
suppose we also observe the ownership link E → A. Our ordering procedure will not
work because there is no starting point: no firm is placed at the bottom of the business
group and, therefore, the leading shareholder cannot be determined.17 Yet, we observe
only few cases of cross-holdings in the data (0.5 percent of the ownership links are
associated with at least one cross-holding).
Output We start with 843,390 direct ownership links that satisfy our control assump-
tions. After the algorithm completes all the missing links, we end up with 1,642,379
ownership links - almost double the ownership links we started with. Based on the com-
plete set of ownership links, our algorithm extracts 769,725 ownership chains. Only
4,141 ownership chains are associated with a cross-holding. We drop these chains be-
cause for them, we cannot determine the exact structure of the ownership chain. The
average ownership chain includes 3.8 firms with a median of 3 firms (25 percent of the
17A less ‘severe’ case of cross-holding is where we observe E → D. In this case, our algorithm
constructs two ownership chains: A → D → E and A → D → E, where both correctly characterize
the ownership structure. The leading shareholder is firm A in both cases, which allows us to correctly
group firms into business groups.
ownership chains have 5 firms and more, where the maximum number of firms in a
chain is 16). 330,098 firms are located at the top of the chain (leading shareholders).
On average, a leading shareholder owns 87 percent of the firm it controls (directly or
indirectly), where the median is 100 percent and the minimum is 0.1 percent.18
A.1.2. Ultimate owner name matching
The second part of our algorithm groups all firms across ownership chains based on
the name of the ultimate owner of each leading shareholder (i.e., the firm at the top
of each control chain). The raw data from the Amadeus ownership database contain
strings describing the ultimate-owner names. The names vary in their patterns, for
example: “JOHN SMITH”, “JOHN F SMITH”, “SMITH AND SONS”, “THE SMITH
FAMILY”, “PROF. VAR DER SMITH”, etc.
The name matching process deals with three main issues. First, ultimate owner
names are not standardized, i.e., the same name can be spelled diﬀerently across sub-
sidiaries. Second, common names may lead to ‘over-grouping’. Third, for wealthy
families, we frequently observe that diﬀerent members control diﬀerent leading share-
holders. Thus, we have to determine whether to group firms at the family level or at
the individual level.
We deal with theses issues as follows. First, we develop a name standardization
procedure that harmonizes the diﬀerent string patterns in our data. For example,
“PROF. JOHN SMITH AND SONS” becomes “JOHN SMITH”. Second, we search
for publicly available information on each of our largest 500 business groups. When
we cannot verify from public sources (such as Forbes and The Economist) that a given
family is indeed wealthy, we check for name commonality. We compute the frequency
of the appearance of the name in the ultimate owner population. In case this frequency
is higher than the median frequency, we assume the common name problem and do
not include that ultimate owner in our sample. Third, we group firms to business
groups at the family level (for example, De Rotchild family, Nasi-Agnelli family). As
a robustness test, we check the sensitivity of our findings to grouping at the individual
level and find that our results are robust to this alternative grouping.
This name matching procedure leaves us with 1,736,034 standardize family names
which we then match to the leading shareholders identified by the ownership algorithm
(369,800 names are actually matched to leading shareholders). Finally, we add firms
without subsidiaries that are controlled by the same ultimate owner.
A.1.3. Summary
We identify 581,108 business groups. The average business group has 33 firms with a
median of 4 (the largest business group has 1882 firms). About 35 percent of business
18When the ultimate owner is a European firm, we can actually check the output of our algorithm
with that of Amadeus. In 96 percent of the cases where Amadeus reports that an ultimate owner is
a widely-held European firm, it is also the leading shareholder found by our algorithm. We attribute
the 4 percent diﬀerence in ultimate owner assignments to the diﬀerent control definitions assumed by
Amadeus.
groups (211,308) are widely-held (the leading shareholder is a widely-held European
firm), where the remaining business groups have a dominant shareholder (family, non-
European firm, or state). Amadeus indicates whether an ultimate owner is one of
the following types: an individual, a financial company, an industrial company or the
state. For business groups where the ultimate owner is a European firm, we determine
whether this ultimate owner is a financial or industrial firms based on the industry
location of the apex firm. The number of firms in a business group varies substantially
across ultimate owner types. For family ultimate owners, the average business group
has 27 firms. This number rises to 97 firms when the ultimate owner is a financial
institution, to 46 firms when the ultimate owner is a widely-held corporation and to
521 when the ultimate owner is the state.
A.2. Matching patent data
A.2.1. European Patent Oﬃce (EPO)
The matching between EPO patent applicants and Amadeus firms has been a collabo-
rative project with the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) and the Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP).19 This section is a brief summary of the matching procedure de-
scribed in the CEP/IFS AmaPat document and is included here for completeness.
Our main information source on patents is the April 2004 publication of the PAT-
STAT database, which is the standard source for European patent data. This database
contains all bibliographic data (including citations) on all European patent applications
and granted patents, from the beginning of the EPO system in 1979 to 2004.
We match the name of each EPO applicant listed on the patent document to the full
name of a firm listed in Amadeus (about 8 million names). Since we are interested only
in matching patent applicants to firms, we exclude applicant names that fall into the
following categories: government agencies, universities, and individuals. We identify
government agencies and universities by searching for a set of identifying strings in
their name. We identify individuals as patents where the assignee and the inventor
name strings are identical.
The matching procedure follows two main steps. (i) Standardizing names of patent
applicants. This involves replacing commonly used strings which symbolize the same
thing, for example “Ltd.” and “Limited” in the UK.20 We remove spaces between
characters and transform all letters to capital letters. As an example, the name “British
Nuclear Fuels Public Limited Company” becomes “BRITISHNUCLEARFUELSPLC”.
(ii) Name matching: match the standard names of the patent applicants with Amadeus
firms. If there is no match, then try to match to the old firm name available in
Amadeus. We need to confront a number of issues. First, in any given year, the
Amadeus database excludes the names of firms that have not filed financial reports for
19We extend our gratitude to the tremendous work done by Rachel Griﬃth and the IFS team,
especially Gareth Macartney in developing and implementing the patent matching. More information
about the matching is available at: "AmaPat: Accounting, Ownership and Patents for European
Firms" (CEP/IFS AmaPat document).
20The complete list of strings is available in the CEP/IFS AmaPat document.
four consecutive years (e.g. M&A, default). We deal with this issue in several ways.
First, we use information from historical versions of the Amadeus database (1995-
2003) on names and name changes. Second, even though Amadeus contains a unique
firm identifier (BVD ID number), there are cases in which firms with identical names
have diﬀerent BVD numbers. In these cases, we use other variables for identification,
for example: address (ZIP code), Date of incorporation (whether consistent with the
patent application date), and more. Finally, we manually match most of the remaining
corporate patents to the list of Amadeus firms.
A.2.2. United States Patents and Trademarks Oﬃce (USPTO)
The procedure described above matches European firms to patents registered with
the EPO. Yet, some European firms register patents only with the USPTO, without
applying to the EPO. In order to identify the European firms that only apply to the
USPTO, we match the complete set of Amadeus firms to the name of the patent
applicants from the USPTO. The most updated patent database for the USPTO is
the 2002 version of the NBER patents and citations data archive.21 Because this
database covers patent information only up to 2002 and our accounting data go up
to 2004, we updated the patent data file by extracting all information about patents
granted between 2002 and 2004 directly from the USPTO website.22 Having updated
the USPTO patent database, we follow the matching procedure described above to
create the matched USPTO patent data for the Amadeus firms.
Firms can apply for patents for the same invention with both the EPO and the
USPTO. Patents protecting the same invention across diﬀerent organizations are called
a patent family. To avoid double counting of inventions, information on patent families
is needed. We collect this information from the OECD Triadic database on patent
families.23 Having identified inventions that belong to the same family, we exclude
patents granted by the USPTO that belong to the same family of patents granted by
the EPO.
A.3. Matching academic publications
The largest database on academic publications is the ISI Web of Knowledge (WoK)
by Thomson. This includes millions of records on publications in academic journals.
The data is divided to three main categories based on the publication type: hard sci-
ences, social sciences, and arts and humanities. Because we are interested in capturing
investment in scientific research, we focus only on the hard sciences section of WoK.
This section includes publication records over the period 1970-2004. The address field
on each record indicates the aﬃliation of the authors of the publication. This aﬃli-
ation is typically either a research institution or a firm. We use the name appearing
21http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/bhdata.html
22http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm
23This includes patents that are registered in all three main patents oﬃces: the EPO, JPO, and
USPTO.
in this field and match it to the complete list of Amadeus firms. We follow the same
matching procedure as described above for the EPO and USPTO patent matching.
Articles may have more than one author (the median number of authors per article
is 2). In this case, the address field would include multiple aﬃliations. We assign an
academic publication to a specific firm if the name of this firm appears at least once
in the address field of the article. This procedure means that a single article can be
assigned to more than one firm, but a firm cannot be assigned more than once to the
same article. For each article, we also extract information on the number of times it
was cited, the journal in which it was published, and the year of publication. Informa-
tion about the importance of journals is taken from the Journal Citations Report index
(JCR). Finally, European research institutions can be incorporated, thus, they appear
in Amadeus as potential firms to be matched. To screen out such firms, we follow
two steps. First, as for patent matching, we drop Amadeus names that include strings
that are associated with research institutions (such as, UNIVERSITY, RESEARCH,
INSTITUTION, etc.). Second, we manually examine the websites of firms that have
a large number of publications but appear as small firms in terms of their sales and
number of patents. For these firms, we check whether their primary activity is research.
In case the primary activity is research, we exclude them from our matched sample.
A.4. Accounting database
The accounting information is taken from Amadeus. The database contains financial
information on about 8 million firms from 34 countries, including all the European
Union countries and Eastern Europe. The accounts of each firm are followed for up to
ten years. The information source for Amadeus is about 50 country vendors (generally
the oﬃce of register of Companies). The main advantage of Amadeus over other data
sources is its coverage of small and medium size firms.
The accounting database includes items from the balance sheet (22 items) and
income statement (22 items). No information is available from the changes in cash
flow report (i.e., investment data is not available). The accounting data is harmonized
by BvD to enhance comparison across countries. This comparison becomes easier over
time due to the improvement in the European Union harmonization is accounting
standards. In addition to accounting data items, Amadeus provides a description of
firms including their product market activity. The main descriptive items are legal
form (public versus private), date of incorporation, types of accounts (consolidated
versus unconsolidated), country, US SIC and NAIC for the product market activity of
the firm (primary and non-primary). The industry location information includes up to
eight diﬀerent six-digit NAIC codes per firm (note that the sales of the firm are not
broken-up across the diﬀerent product markets).
An important feature of the data is the criteria for dropping firms from the sample
over time. As long as a firm continues to file its financial statements, it continues
to appear in Amadeus. In case a firm becomes inactive, it stops filing its financial
statement (alternatively, a firm can be late in filing its financial statement). This firm
will be kept in the sample for four extra years since the last year financial statements
were reported (thus, in the fifth year the firm will be removed from the sample). For
example, a firm that becomes inactive and stops filing its reports in 1995 (i.e., 1994
is the last year when a financial statement was reported) will remain in the database
until 1998 (including) and in 1999, it will be dropped from the sample (all observations
of the specific firm will be taken out from the Amadeus database in the 1999 update).
In order to mitigate the problem of losing dead firms, we purchased old Amadeus disks
that allow tracking firms that exit the sample in previous years. For example, the firm
that exits in 1995 will appear in the 1998 Amadeus disk, but not in the 1999 disk. By
using both 1998 and 1999 disks, we mitigate the selection bias of dropping inactive
firms after 4 years of missing data.
A.5. Constructing industry variables
We construct the industry measures used in the econometric specifications, using data
from Compustat and Amadeus. The following variables are based on Compustat. They
are a weighted average over the period 1980-2004 and are computed at the three-digit
US SIC level. External Finance Dependence - this variable is defined as the ratio of
Capital Expenditures (Compustat #128) minus Cash Flow (#110) to Capital Expen-
ditures. When #110 is missing, Cash Flow is defined as the sum of the following
Compustat items: #123, #125, #126, #106, #213, and #217. External Equity De-
pendence - this variable is defined as the ratio of the net amount of equity issued (#108
minus #115) to capital expenditures. Investment Intensity - this variable is defined as
the ratio of capital expenditures to net property, plant, and equipment (#8). Tobin’s
Q - this variable is defined as the ratio of firm value to the book value of capital. Firm
value is the sum of the values of common stock, preferred stock, and total debt net
of current assets (#11 + #10 + #9 - #4). Book value of capital includes net plant,
property and equipment, inventories and intangibles other than R&D (#3 + #8 +
#33). Tobin’s Q was set to 0.1 for values below 0.1 and at 20 for values above 20.
R&D Intensity - this variable is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditures (#46) to
sales (#12).
The following variables are based on Amadeus and are a weighted average over
the period 1995-2004: Productivity Growth Dispersion - this variable is defined as
the diﬀerence of the three-year average productivity growth rate between the 90th
percentile and the 10th percentile for each three-digit US SIC. Productivity is defined
as the weighted average of the ratio between sales and number of employees. Lerner
index - this variable is defined as the industry median of the firm-weighted average of
one minus the ratio of profits to sales. Both variables are computed based on UK data.
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